The auditing subsystem provides the system administrator with the means to record security-relevant information, which can be analyzed to detect potential and actual violations of the system security policy. The auditing subsystem has three functions:
Each of these functions can be configured by the system administrator.
Event detection is distributed throughout the Trusted Computing Base (TCB), both in the kernel (supervisor state code) and the trusted programs (user state code). An auditable event is any security-relevant occurrence in the system. A security-relevant occurrence is any change to the security state of the system, any attempted or actual violation of the system access control or accountability security policies, or both. The programs and kernel modules that detect auditable events are responsible for reporting these events to the system audit logger, that runs as part of the kernel and can be accessed either with a subroutine (for trusted program auditing) or within a kernel procedure call (for supervisor state auditing). The information reported includes the name of the auditable event, the success or failure of the event, and any additional event-specific information that is relevant to security auditing.
Event detection configuration consists of turning event detection on or off, either at the global (system) level or at the local (process) level. To control event detection at the global level, use the audit command to enable or disable the audit subsystem. To control event detection at the local level, you can audit selected users for groups of audit events (audit classes).
Information collection encompasses logging the selected auditable events. This function is performed by the kernel audit logger, which provides both an SVC (subroutine) and an intra-kernel procedure call interface that records auditable events.
The audit logger is responsible
for constructing the complete audit record, consisting of the audit header,
that contains information common to all events (such as the name of the event,
the user responsible, the time and return status of the event), and the audit
trail, which contains event-specific information. The audit logger
appends each successive record to the kernel audit trail, which can be written
in either (or both) of two modes:
|BIN mode||The trail is written into alternating files, providing for safety and long-term storage.|
|STREAM mode||The trail is written to a circular buffer that is read synchronously through an audit pseudo-device. STREAM mode offers immediate response.|
Information collection can be configured at both the front end (event recording) and at the back end (kernel trail processing). Event recording is selectable on a per-user basis. Each user has a defined set of audit events that are actually logged in the kernel trail when they occur. At the back end, the modes are individually configurable, so that the administrator can employ the back-end processing best suited for a particular environment. In addition, BIN mode auditing can be configured to shut down the system in the event of failure.
The operating system provides several options for processing the kernel audit trail. The BIN mode trail can be compressed, filtered or formatted for output, or any reasonable combination of these before archival storage of the audit trail, if any. Compression is done through Huffman encoding. Filtering is done with standard query language (SQL)-like audit record selection (using the auditselect command) and provides for both selective viewing and selective retention of the audit trail. Formatting of audit trail records can be used to examine the audit trail, to generate periodic security reports, and to print a paper audit trail. The STREAM mode audit trail can be monitored in real time, to provide immediate threat monitoring capability. Configuration of these options is handled by separate programs that can be invoked as daemon processes to filter either BIN or STREAM mode trails, although some of the filter programs are more naturally suited to one mode or the other.
The set of auditable events on the system defines which occurrences can actually be audited and the granularity of the auditing provided. The auditable events must cover the security-relevant events on the system, as defined previously. The level of detail you use for auditable event definition must tread a fine line between insufficient detail, leading to excessive information collection, and too much detail, making it difficult for the administrator to logically understand the selected information. The definition of events takes advantage of similarities in detected events. For the purpose of this discussion, a detected event is any single instance of an auditable event; for instance, a given event might be detected in various places. The underlying principle is that detected events with similar security properties are selected as the same auditable event. The following list shows an event classification:
Security Policy Events Subject Events - process creation - process deletion - setting subject security attributes: user IDs, group IDs, - process group, control terminal Object Events - object creation - object deletion - object open (including processes as objects) - object close (including processes as objects) - setting object security attributes: owner, group, ACL Import/Export Events - importing or exporting an object Accountability Events - adding a user, changing user attributes in the password database - adding a group, changing group attributes in the group database - user login - user logoff - changing user authentication information - trusted path terminal configuration - authentication configuration - auditing administration: selecting events and audit trails, switching on/off, defining user auditing classes General System Administration Events - use of privilege - file system configuration - device definition and configuration - system configuration parameter definition - normal system IPL and shutdown - RAS configuration - other system configuration Security Violations (potential) - access permission refusals - privilege failures - diagnostically detected faults and system errors - (attempted) alteration of the TCB.
The auditing subsystem has a global state variable that indicates whether the auditing subsystem is on or off. In addition, each process has a local state variable that indicates whether the auditing subsystem should record information about this process. Both of these variables determine whether events are detected by the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) modules and programs. Turning TCB auditing off for a specific process allows that process to do its own auditing and not to bypass the system accountability policy. Permitting a trusted program to audit itself allows for more efficient and effective collection of information.
Information collection addresses event selection and kernel audit trail modes. It is done by a kernel routine that provides interfaces to log information, used by the TCB components that detect auditable events, and configuration interfaces, used by the auditing subsystem to control the audit logger routine.
Auditable events are logged with one of two interfaces, the user state and supervisor state. The user state part of the TCB uses the auditlog or auditwrite subroutine, while the supervisor state portion of the TCB uses a set of kernel procedure calls.
For each record, the audit event logger prefixes an audit header to the event-specific information. This header identifies the user and process for which this event is being audited, as well as the time of the event. The code that detects the event supplies the event type and return code or status and optionally, additional event-specific information (the event tail). Event-specific information consists of object names (for example, files refused access or tty used in failed login attempts), subroutine parameters, and other modified information.
Events are defined symbolically, rather than numerically. This lessens the chances of name collisions, without using an event registration scheme. Because subroutines are auditable and the extendable kernel definition has no fixed SVC numbers, it is difficult to record events by number. The number mapping would have to be revised and logged every time the kernel interface was extended or redefined.
The audit records consist of a common header, followed by audit trails peculiar to the audit event of the record. The structures for the headers are defined in the /usr/include/sys/audit.h file. The format of the information in the audit trails is peculiar to each base event and is shown in the /etc/security/audit/events file.
The information in the audit header is generally collected by the logging routine to ensure its accuracy, while the information in the audit trails is supplied by the code that detects the event. The audit logger has no knowledge of the structure or semantics of the audit trails. For example, when the login command detects a failed login it records the specific event with the terminal on which it occurred and writes the record into the audit trail using the auditlog subroutine. The audit logger kernel component records the subject-specific information (user IDs, process IDs, time) in a header and appends this to the other information. The caller supplies only the event name and result fields in the header.
The audit logger is responsible for constructing the complete audit record. You must select the audit events that you want to be logged.
Audit event selection has two
different types: per-process and per-object.
|Per-Process Auditing||To select process events with reasonable efficiency and usability, the
operating system allows the system administrator to define audit
classes. An audit class is a subset of the base auditing events in the
system. Auditing classes provide for convenient logical groupings of
the base auditing events.
For each user on the system, the system administrator defines a set of audit classes that determines the base events that could be recorded for that user. Each process run by the user is tagged with its audit classes.
|Per-Object Auditing||The operating system provides for the auditing of object accesses by name, that is, the auditing of specific objects (normally files). Most objects are not that interesting from a security perspective. By-name object auditing prevents having to cover all object accesses to audit the few pertinent objects. In addition, the auditing mode can be specified, so that only accesses of the specified mode (read/write/execute) are recorded.|
Kernel logging can be set to BIN or STREAM modes to define where the kernel audit trail is to be written. If the BIN mode is used, the kernel audit logger must be given (before audit startup) at least one file descriptor to which records are to be appended.
BIN mode consists of writing the audit records into alternating files. At auditing startup, the kernel is passed two file descriptors and an advisory maximum bin size. It suspends the calling process and starts writing audit records into the first file descriptor. When the size of the first bin reaches the maximum bin size, and if the second file descriptor is valid, it switches to the second bin and reactivates the calling process. It keeps writing into the second bin until it is called again with another valid file descriptor. If at that point the second bin is full, it switches back to the first bin, and the calling process returns immediately. Otherwise, the calling process is suspended, and the kernel continues writing records into the second bin until it is full. Processing continues this way until auditing is turned off.
The STREAM mode is much simpler than the BIN mode. The kernel writes records into a circular buffer. When the kernel reaches the end of the buffer, it simply wraps to the beginning. Processes read the information through a pseudo-device called /dev/audit. When a process opens this device, a new channel is created for that process. Optionally, the events to be read on the channel can be specified as a list of audit classes.
The main purpose of the STREAM mode is to allow for timely reading of the audit trail, which is desirable for real-time threat monitoring. Another use is to create a paper trail that is written immediately, preventing any possible tampering with the audit trail, as is possible if the trail is stored on some writable media.